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San Bernardino Physicians' Services Medical
Group, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino:
Constitutionally Protected Public Contract
Property Interests Under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983
In 1980, San Bernardino Physicians' Services Medical
Group ("the Group"), a California professional corporation,
contracted with the San Bernardino County Board of Supervi-
sors to provide professional emergency room, burn-care, and
surgical services to the county-operated hospital.1 In May 1981,
the county breached the contracts by harassing the Group's em-
ployees, attempting to terminate the contracts prematurely,
and systematically impeding the Group's practice.2 The Group
sued the county and the Board of Supervisors in federal court
under 42 U.S.C. section 19833 alleging that the county had de-
1. San Bernardino Physicians' Servs. Medical Group, Inc. v. County of
San Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1987).
2. 1& at 1406.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the pur-
poses of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District
of Columbia.
Anyone whose constitutional rights have been violated by persons acting
under color of state law has a cause of action under § 1983. E. CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 370 (1989). Section 1983 thus provides a vehicle for
most suits in federal courts against local governments and state and local gov-
ernment officials to rectify violations of federal law. I- at 369. State govern-
ments may not be sued under § 1983 because of eleventh amendment
immunity. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979); see also infra note 20.
Although § 1983 creates a federal cause of action, it does not directly confer
federal court jurisdiction. Federal court jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. V). Id- at 370.
Following the Civil War, endemic violence against blacks led Congress to
enact the Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1 of which is currently embodied in
§ 1983. E. CHE1iERINSKy, supra, at 373. The Supreme Court, in summarizing
the legislative history of the Act, has concluded that the Act was intended to
provide a federal guarantee of "the basic federal rights of individuals against
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prived the Group of property without due process. 4 Determin-
ing that a government contract, without more, could not create
a constitutionally protected interest, the district court granted
summary judgment for the county. 5 In San Bernardino Physi-
cians' Services Medical Group, Inc. v. County of San Bernar-
dino,6 the Ninth Circuit, while acknowledging that some
government contracts can create constitutionally protected
property interests, 7 held that the Group did not possess a con-
stitutionally protected property right because the Group's em-
ployees did not hold the professional service contracts
individually.8 In effect, based on its concern for avoiding "fed-
eralizing" all breach of contract cases involving governments,
the Ninth Circuit determined that corporate public contracts
are not entitled to constitutional protection, and thus imposed a
new, unique, and questionable limitation on the scope of section
1983 actions.9
This Comment argues that the restrictions on the use of
section 1983 imposed by San Bernardino Physicians' are ill-
founded and largely unnecessary. In light of recent Supreme
Court decisions, existing mechanisms for screening and decid-
ing section 1983 claims are sufficient, and the Ninth Circuit's
distinction disadvantaging corporate public contract property
interests is unwarranted. Part I explains the development and
limitations of the concept of "protected property" as used in
section 1983 litigation. Part II details and analyzes the San Ber-
incursions by state power." Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982).
Section 1983 has not been used extensively until recently. E. CHEMERIN-
SKY, supra, at 375. The Supreme Court decision in Monroe v. Pape expanded
application of § 1983 to provide a federal cause of action to plaintiffs who al-
leged that municipal officers, acting under color of state law, deprived them of
constitutionally protected rights. 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961); see also infra
note 20. Since Monroe, the number of § 1983 cases has increased significantly.
See E. CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 375 (discussing the "phenomenal" increase in
the number of § 1983 suits since 1961); see also infra note 23.




7. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the district court's conclusion that
"contractual rights alone cannot create property interests protected by the
Due Process Clause" was "contrary to federal and state decisions holding that
contracts may create protected property interests." Id. at 1407.
8. Id. at 1409-10.
9. The court characterized its approach as requiring "a determination
that Physicians' Groups' supply contracts are fundamentally different from
tenured employment contracts, which are protected by a due process require-
ment of predeprivation hearing." Id at 1410 n.7.
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nardino Physicians' decision. Part III evaluates the San Ber-
nardino Physicians' decision in light of existing precedent and
federalism concerns. Part IV recommends that courts employ
existing mechanisms for resolving section 1983 claims rather
than adopting the San Bernardino Physicians' test.
I. "PROTECTED" PROPERTY UNDER SECTION 1983:
DEVELOPMENT OF A LIMITED CONCEPT
A. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF PROTECTED PROPERTY
1. Inception and Development of "Constitutionally Protected
Property"
The United States Supreme Court introduced the concept
of a statutory entitlement as a form of constitutionally pro-
tected property in Goldberg v. Kelly.' ° After finding that wel-
fare benefits constituted a protected property interest,"- the
Court held that procedural due process rights depend on the
balance between the beneficiary's interest and the govern-
ment's interest.'2 The Goldberg decision expanded the possibil-
ity for due process clause litigation based on deprivation of
entitlements.'3
10. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The fourteenth amendment prohibits governmen-
tal actions that deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Persons subject to such depri-
vation are entitled to a "fair procedure to determine the basis for, and legality
of, such action." J. NoWAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
452 (3d ed. 1986). The Supreme Court has interpreted this need for procedural
due process as requiring "some kind of prior hearing." Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). In determining whether due process require-
ments apply, courts first must ascertain whether constitutionally protected in-
terests have been affected. Id at 570-71.
11. In Goldberg, the Court did not specifically define or limit what consti-
tutes a statutory entitlement.
12. The Goldberg Court, having found an entitlement (an issue not con-
tested in the case), concerned itself with determining what process, if any, was
due the appellant. 397 U.S. at 260-63. The Court stated: "[t]he extent to
which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by
the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring), and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding
that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication." Id.
at 262-63.
13. The Court recognized in Goldberg that a statute can create a constitu-
tionally protected right to a government benefit. Id. at 262. Although the
Court did not explicitly classify such a "statutory entitlement" as property,
this recognition created a completely new class of property entitled to due pro-
cess protection. Id. at 262-63. Later, in Board of Regents v. Roth, the Court
acknowledged that a statutory entitlement to a government benefit is a prop-
1990]
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Courts subsequently have found constitutionally protected
property interests in diverse circumstances: an interest in re-
newing a liquor license,1 4 a contractor's right to timely payment
for work performed under a contract with a state agency,15 the
certification of minority business enterprise status,16 a driver's
license,17 and medical staff privileges at a county hospital.' s In
erty interest for due process purposes by citing Goldberg as an example of a
protected property interest. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
14. Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 948-49 (7th Cir. 1983). In
Reed, the plaintiffs held a municipal annual liquor license that was rescindable
only for cause. Municipal officials, without a prior hearing, refused to renew
the license and decreased the number of available licenses to deny plaintiffs a
license. Id. at 947. In determining that the plaintiffs possessed a constitution-
ally protected property interest in their liquor license, the court defined con-
stitutionally protected property as "what is securely and durably yours under
state (or as in Goldberg, federal) law, as distinct from what you hold subject to
so many conditions as to make your interest meager, transitory, or uncertain."
Id. at 948.
15. Signet Constr. Corp. v. Borg, 775 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1985). A con-
struction company brought a § 1983 action in Signet, alleging that city officials
withheld contract payments without providing a prior hearing. Id, In assess-
ing the claim, the court determined that the contractor's right to timely pay-
ment for work performed under its contract was a constitutionally protected
property interest. Id.
16. Baja Contractors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 667, 676-77 (7th Cir.
1987). In Baja, a contractor filed a § 1983 claim against a city and city officials
alleging that they denied the contractor Minority Business Enterprise (MBE)
certification without due process. Id. at 667. The city previously had certified
the contractor as a concrete contractor under the city's MBE program, and at
that time the city did not distinguish between concrete suppliers and concrete
contractors. Id. at 671. The court invoked the definitions of property em-
ployed in Roth and Reed and found that the contractor had established a rea-
sonable likelihood of having a property interest. Id. at 676-77. The court
determined that the city's action to limit the scope of plaintiff's MBE certifica-
tion to a concrete contractor, as differentiated from a concrete supplier, consti-
tuted deprivation of a protected property interest. Id.
17. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539-40, 542 (1971). Bell, an uninsured mo-
torist involved in an accident, could not post security for the damages and had
his driver's license suspended in accordance with state statute. The statute
prohibited any consideration of fault or responsibility at presuspension hear-
ings. Id. at 536-38. The Supreme Court held that the state could not suspend a
driver's license, once issued, without adequate due process involving considera-
tion of the driver's fault or liability for the accident. Id. at 539-40, 542.
18. Northeast Ga. Radiological Assoc., P.C. v. Tidwell, 670 F.2d 507, 511
(5th Cir. 1982). In Tidwell, a radiologist and his professional corporation filed
a § 1983 claim against a county hospital authority, alleging deprivation of due
process when the hospital authority terminated the radiologist's staff privi-
leges and the corporation's contract. Id at 509-10. The court found that "[tihe
contract, incorporating the medical staff by-laws, and the by-laws per se, estab-
lished 'the existence of rules or mutually explicit understandings,'... and sus-
tained appellants' claim to a protected property interest." Id. at 511 (quoting
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972)).
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a state requiring the award of a government contract to the low
bidder, a federal district court has found that the low bidder
has a protected property interest. 9
Until 1978, the definition of "persons" subject to section
1983 actions excluded municipalities. 20 In Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Services,21 however, the Court reversed itself
and expanded the applicability of section 1983 to include munic-
ipalities as "persons."22 Since Monell, section 1983 litigation has
19. Three Rivers Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 502 F. Supp. 1118,
1131 (W.D. Pa. 1980). The Three Rivers court found that the lack of nonarbi-
trary governmental discretion in awarding a contract gave the low bidder a
protectible property interest. Id at 1131. The court based its reasoning on
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), and Winsett v.
McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc). Id- at 1129-31. In these two
cases, prison inmates seeking parole or discretionary work release sought to
establish a liberty interest arising from state statutes that prescribed the pro-
cedure and criteria for parole or release. Id at 1129-30 (discussing Greenholtz
and Winsett). The Court in Greenholtz determined that the "expectancy of re-
lease provided in [the] statute is entitled to some measure of constitutional
protection." Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12. In Winsett, the court found a liberty
interest arising from the Delaware statute and regulations specifying criteria
for work release. Winsett, 617 F.2d at 1007. The court in Three Rivers accord-
ingly determined that statutes and regulations prescribing the award of the
cablevision contract to the "lowest responsible bidder" conferred a protected
property interest on the lowest responsible bidder in compliance with the con-
tract specifications. Three Rivers, 502 F. Supp. at 1131.
20. Not all governmental entities are "persons" for purposes of § 1983 lia-
bility. Section 1983 may not be used to bring an action against state govern-
ments in federal court. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (holding
that § 1983 does not override state eleventh amendment immunity). In
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court held that the provisions of
§ 1983 did not apply to municipalities. "Congress did not undertake to bring
municipal corporations within the ambit of [§ 1983]." Id at 187. The Court,
however, did permit § 1983 suits against municipal officials. Id at 192. Monroe
provided, for the first time, a federal cause of action to plaintiffs who alleged
that municipal officers, acting under color of state law, deprived them of con-
stitutionally protected rights. Id at 171-87. Like municipal officers, federal
and state officers may be sued under § 1983. However, federal, state, and mu-
nicipal officers may be accorded some degree of immunity from suit depending
upon the circumstances. See E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at § 8.6 (discuss-
ing the applicability and circumstances of government official immunity).
21. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
22. In Monell, female employees of the New York City Department of So-
cial Services and the Board of Education sued the Department and its Com-
missioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the City of New York and its
Mayor. The complaint alleged that the Board and the Department, as a mat-
ter of official policy, required pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of ab-
sence before such leaves were medically necessary. Id at 661. The district
court held that the plaintiffs' action was barred because Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 187 (1961), completely immunized municipalities from suit under
§ 1983. Monell, 394 F. Supp. at 855. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 532 F.2d
259, 268 (2d Cir. 1976). After examining the legislative history of § 1983, the
1990]
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contributed a significant portion of the federal docket.23
Other Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions
have narrowed the applicability of the due process clause in en-
titlement claims cases.2 Determining precisely what "prop-
erty" is entitled to due process protection is a major issue in
these decisions.25 Despite asserting that constitutionally pro-
tected property interests extend beyond traditional notions of
property,26 the Court often has restricted the definition of con-
Supreme Court held that local governments were "persons" for purposes of
§ 1983 litigation. 436 U.S. at 690. The Supreme Court therefore explicitly
overruled Monroe: "we now overrule Monroe v. Pape ... insofar as it holds
that local governments are wholly immune from suit under § 1983." IdL at 663
(footnote omitted). The Court did, however, limit municipal liability to acts
resulting from unconstitutional or illegal municipal policies; municipalities
could not be held vicariously liable, under § 1983, for the acts of their employ-
ees. Id at 691.
Imposition of municipal liability under § 1983 has raised a host of issues
concerning whether and when municipalities' delegation of policy-making au-
thority to municipal officials should result in municipal liability. The Supreme
Court has experienced difficulty enunciating a clear standard in this area. See
Bannard, A Foreseeability-Based Standard for the Determination of Municipal
Liability under Section 1983, 28 B.C.L. REV. 937, 966 (1987) (detailing the de-
velopment of municipal liability under § 1983 and proposing liability when a
municipality's policies or customs could foreseeably deprive a person of a con-
stitutional right).
23. Various estimates of § 1983 claim volume are available. In 1961, when
Monroe was decided, there were 287 § 1983 suits in the federal courts. E.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 371. In 1985, there were 36,582 § 1983 cases in
federal court. Id. At least one commentator estimates that § 1983 claims com-
prise approximately 12% of federal district court civil cases since 1977. Bau-
mann, Civil Rights Litigation: Section 1983, 1 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 203, 205 n.11
(1985). Monell, which held that local governments could be sued under § 1983,
was argued before the Court in 1977 and decided in 1978. 436 U.S. at 658; see
also Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 533 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(noting that in 1961, the year the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape, only
270 civil rights actions were brought in federal district courts compared to
30,000 civil rights suits commenced in 1981). One commentator notes that the
recent volume of § 1983 claims has not grown disproportionately to the rest of
the federal docket. E. CHEMERiNSKY, supra note 3, at 376.
24. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth, the
Court limited application of the due process clause to the deprivation of those
interests that the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property
addresses. Id. at 569. Holding that the respondent did not have a property in-
terest entitled to due process, the Court noted that the range of interests pro-
tected by procedural due process is not infinite. Id at 569-70; see also infra
notes 72-117 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 965-67 (2d
Cir. 1988) (discussing Supreme Court decisions enlarging the scope of interests
that the due process clause protects, requiring the circuit court to determine
whether the plaintiff has a protected property interest in its contract).
26. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-72. In defining "liberty" and "property," the
Roth Court posited broad and developing concepts "'purposely left to gather
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stitutionally protected property interests.27
Heeding the Supreme Court's warning that the due process
clause does not protect all property interests,28 lower federal
courts have attempted to interpret and embroider the Supreme
Court's decisions elucidating protected property interests.29
One particularly important area for resolving the issue of what
constitutes protected property is contracts.
2. Contracts as Protected Property
It is well settled that a contract can create a constitution-
ally protected property interest. In Board of Regents v. Roth30
and Permj v. Sindermann,31 the Supreme Court recognized that
"property," for due process purposes, includes rights to certain
contractually conferred government benefits.32 Both Roth and
Sindermann involved public employment contracts.33 In Roth,
meaning from experience.... [and which] relate to the whole domain of social
and economic fact."' I& (quoting National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). The Court explic-
itly indicated that protected property interests extend beyond traditional no-
tions of property, such as the ownership of real estate, chattels, or money. rd
at 572. Rather than adhering to "formalistic limitations," the Court's defini-
tion of property goes to the beneficial nature of the interest and the security
with which a person holds the interest. I& at 576.
27. In order to establish operable boundaries for the "property" concept,
the Court necessarily must restrict its definition. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572. Deter-
mining that some property interests are entitled to constitutional protection,
the Court has slowly defined the parameters of the entitlement through its
subsequent decisions. See infra notes 72-117 and accompanying text.
28. "[The range of property interests protected by the Due Process
Clause is not infinite." Roth, 408 U.S. at 570.
29. Courts have had difficulty with this task because of the broad defini-
tions that the Supreme Court has employed. See, e.g., Reich v. Beharry, 883
F.2d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 1989) (indicating that this circuit, as well as other courts,
has found it difficult to identify which contract rights constitute protectible
property interests for due process purposes and which do not).
30. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
31. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
32. In Roth, the plaintiff, a state university professor with a one year con-
tract, was informed without explanation that his contract would not be re-
newed. The plaintiff subsequently sued the university, claiming that the
university's failure to inform him of the reason for his nonrenewal violated his
right to procedural due process. 408 U.S. at 566-69. The Court held that the
fourteenth amendment did not require a hearing prior to nonrenewal of a non-
tenured state teacher's contract unless a property interest in continued em-
ployment could be demonstrated. The Court then found that the terms of the
plaintiff's contract granted him no protected property interest. Id at 576-78.
33. In Sindernann, the plaintiff had been employed as a professor in the
Texas state college system for ten years under a series of one year contracts.
408 U.S. 593, 594 (1972). The Board of Regents, without providing an explana-
tion or prior hearing, declined to renew the plaintiff's contract. Id. at 596-97.
1990]
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the Court found that the plaintiff did not have a protected
property right in the renewal of a one year employment con-
tract. In Sindermann, the Court found a protected property
right in a tenured employment contract.35 Rather than limiting
its holding to employment contracts, the Court's definition of
protected property in Sindermann was pointedly expansive.
The Court noted that property interests protected by proce-
dural due process are "not limited to a few rigid technical
forms."3 6 Instead, the Court found that "'property' denotes a
broad range of interests that are secured by 'existing rules or
understandings.' ,,37
In contrast to its admonition that protected property has no
fixed technical categories, the Court in Roth and Sindermann
established some limits on protected property. The Court de-
termined that although independent sources such as state law
create and define protected property interests,38 federal law de-
termines whether an interest is entitled to constitutional pro-
Although the college had no tenure system, the faculty guide indicated that
faculty members should feel that they had permanent tenure as long as their
work was satisfactory. I& at 600. The plaintiff brought an action alleging that,
in light of the existing de facto tenure program, nonrenewal of his contract
without a prior hearing deprived him of due process. Id at 595. Finding that
the plaintiff may have a contractually created protected property interest, the
Court found that property interests protected by procedural due process are
those interests "that are secured by 'existing rules or understandings"' that
may be invoked at a hearing to support the entitlement claim. Id at 601 (cit-
ing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). The Court then noted that written contracts, as evi-
dence of a formal understanding, support claims of entitlement and may
create a property interest. Id at 601.
34. 408 U.S. at 578.
35. 408 U.S. at 601-03.
36. Id at 601 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-72).
37. Id (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-72) (emphasis added). "A person's in-
terest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process purposes if there are
such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of enti-
tlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing." Id; see also
supra note 32.
38. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. "Property interests, of course, are not created by
the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions defined by ex-
isting rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law - rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that sup-
port claims of entitlement to those benefits." Id Cases dealing with property
interests created by independent sources include: Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 601
(holding that a written contract with state college system including specific
tenure provision is evidence supporting claim of entitlement to continued em-
ployment); and Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that statutorily conferred one year municipal liquor license revokable
only for cause is constitutionally protected property).
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tection.39 Thus, not all state-created contract rights are entitled
to federal due process protection.40 Additionally, an individual
must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to possess consti-
tutionally protected property.4 ' Because the Court's definition
implies that a person must have more than a mere expectation
of an interest,42 the Court has effectively imposed a threshold
requirement that an interest be "held securely" in order to be a
protected property interest. The Court's approach to defining
protected property's parameters implies that once the plaintiff
makes a threshold showing of "secure holding," the Court ap-
plies an expansive approach to defining protected property.
Courts generally recognize, in accordance with Roth and
Sindermann, that public employment contracts are the prime
protected category of contract-created interests.43 Courts, how-
39. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (citing
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
40. See, e.g., id. at 9-12 (stating that federal constitutional law determines
whether a property interest rises to the level of a "legitimate entitlement,"
and distinguishing between an interest in uninterrupted utility service created
by Tennessee case law and the constitutional protection conferred if such an
interest is terminable only for cause).
41. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 601 (citing Roth).
42. In Roth, the Supreme Court distinguished securely held property from
the mere hope or desire for property as a basis for constitutional protection:
The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a
safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already ac-
quired in specific benefits.... To have a property interest in a benefit,
a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for
it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of
the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which
people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily
undermined.
Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77 (emphasis added); see also Storek & Storek, Inc. v.
Port of Oakland, 869 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that plaintiff's
preliminary approval of a development project constituted merely an "expec-
tation," rather than a protected property interest); Reed v. Village of Shore-
wood, 704 F.2d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing protected property from
an interest that is held subject to so many conditions so as to make it "meager,
transitory or uncertain").
43. The seminal cases of Roth and Sindermann involved claims of em-
ployment. In Roth, the respondent, an assistant professor with a one year con-
tract at a state university, contested his lack of reappointment without review.
Roth, 408 U.S. at 566-69. In Sindermann, the respondent, a teacher for ten
years in a state college system, contested his lack of reappointment without re-
view. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 594-95.
Many of the subsequent developmental Supreme Court cases also have in-
volved employment claims. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 660-61 (1978) (involving pregnant employees compelled to take
unpaid leaves not contingent on medical necessity); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
1990]
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ever, have had difficulty determining what other kinds of con-
tract "property interests" deserve due process protection."
Notwithstanding the wide variety of statutorily or contractually
created rights held to be property entitled to due process pro-
tection, some lower courts have exhibited marked reluctance to
extend protected contract property rights beyond those con-
ferred specifically in Roth and Sindermann.
In Brown v. Brienen,45 a Seventh Circuit opinion by Judge
Posner, the court expressed doubt about extending protected
property status to the breach of a contract other than an em-
ployment contract.46 In Brown, sheriff's department employ-
ees brought a section 1983 action against the county for refusing
to allow them to take accrued compensatory time off.47
Although not actually deciding whether the county's breach of
plaintiffs' employment contract constituted a deprivation of
protected property, the opinion discussed the issue at length.4
Recognizing that Roth and Sindermann concluded that an em-
ployment contract could create a protectible property interest,
the court nonetheless distinguished a breach of contract that
terminates employment from all other breaches of the con-
tract.49 Admonishing that the fourteenth amendment was not
intended to federalize all public law, the court asserted that
"[o]nly interests substantial enough to warrant the protection
341, 342-43 (1976) (involving the termination of a municipal police officer with-
out hearing); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 136-38 (1974) (dealing with the
termination of a civil servant without appropriate due process).
The federal circuit courts also have recognized that employment consti-
tutes the prime protected category for § 1983 actions. S & D Maintenance Co.
v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 967 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that "[t]hus far, the course of
law in this Circuit has not moved beyond according procedural due process
protection to interests other than those well within the contexts illustrated by
Goldberg and Roth"); Physicians' Serv. Medical Group, Inc. v. County of San
Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[t]he prime pro-
tected category which has supplied nearly all of the successful contract-based
section 1983 actions, is that of employment contracts").
44. Compare San Bernardino Physicians', 825 F.2d at 1409-10 (determin-
ing that a physician group's contract to provide medical services is not a consti-
tutionally protected property interest) with Three Rivers Cablevision, Inc. v.
City of Pittsburgh, 502 F. Supp. 1118, 1131-32 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (determining
that in light of a state law mandating the award of a contract to the lowest
bidder, plaintiff had a protectible property interest in the award of a cable tel-
evision contract). See supra note 19 (discussing Three Rivers).
45. 722 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1983).
46. Id. at 365.
47. Id. at 362.
48. 1d. at 363-65.
49. 1d. at 364-65.
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of federal law and federal courts are Fourteenth Amendment
property interests."50 The court then determined that a finding
of a substantial interest depends on how securely it is held and
its importance to the holder.5' Although the Brown court did
not hold that the plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest,
the court's analysis implies that breaching an employment con-
tract, short of terminating employment, is not sufficiently im-
portant to the holder to warrant protected property status. 52 In
contrast, Judge Posner indicated that constructive discharge
through employer harassment would constitute a deprivation of
protected property, provided that the employee had a valid
contract.53
Other court decisions expressing reluctance to extend pro-
tected property parameters include S & D Maintenance Co. v.
Goldin,54 Walentas v. Lipper55 and Boucvalt v. Board of Com-
50. IE at 364 (citing White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 684 (5th Cir. 1981)).
51. Id. at 364.
52. Id at 364-65.
53. I at 365.
54. 844 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1988). In S & D Maintenance, the Second Circuit
considered whether a municipal contract to maintain parking meters is a pro-
tected property interest entitling the contract holder to due process. Id at 964-
67. The court expressed doubt that a municipal parking contract conferred a
protected property interest and voiced its reluctance to extend procedural due
process protection to interests beyond those approved by Roth. Id. at 967. The
court manifested both a logistical and a doctrinal concern with federalizing
public contract actions. The court first expressed apprehension about federal
courts examining the procedural fairness of every breach of a state contract,
and then alluded to untoward doctrinal implications resulting from shifting
the whole of state public law to the federal courts. Id at 966-67. Because it
deemed the contract too insecurely held, however, the court found it unneces-
sary to rule on whether the corporate contract conferred a protected property
interest. Id at 965-67.
55. 862 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1988). In Walentas, the Second Circuit examined
whether a conditional municipal development contract could confer a constitu-
tionally protected interest. Id. at 418. The court, citing S & D Maintenance,
repeated its concerns about extending protected contract property doctrine be-
yond Roth. The Walentas court reasoned:
Courts have accordingly been wary of the consequences that
might arise if section 1983 were expanded to encompass substantially
all public contract rights . . . . '[We hesitate to extend the doctrine
further to constitutionalize contractual interests that are not associ-
ated with any cognizable status of the claimant beyond its temporary
role as a governmental contractor.... [Tihis case affords no occasion
for any extension of existing doctrine because the [plaintiff's] con-
tracts do not provide it with entitlements within the traditional un-
derstanding of Roth.
Id (footnotes omitted) (quoting S & D Maintenance, 844 F.2d at 966-67).
The court interpreted Roth to be limited to "situations which involve con-
tracts with tenure provisions and the like, or where a clearly implied promise
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missioners.56 In each of these decisions, the circuit courts find
the protected property concept to be problematic and, after ex-
tended discussion of the concept's difficulties, resolve their
cases through other means.
3. Federalizing Breach of Public Contract Claims
Faced with the difficulty of drawing a line between those
public contract property rights that should be accorded consti-
tutional protection, and those that should not, courts have been
reluctant to federalize public contract disputes by expanding
the scope of section 1983 claims.
The reasons for the courts' reluctance often are not stated
explicitly. Courts frequently speak in general terms of the neg-
ative consequences of expanding due process to cover all public
contract rights. For example, in Brown, the court cautioned
that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to shift all
state law into federal courts.5 7 In S & D Maintenance, the Sec-
ond Circuit expressed concern for the "doctrinal implications"
raised by constitutionalizing all public contract rights.58 In
of continued employment has been made." Id. at 418. The court held that the
conditional development contract, terminable at any time at the municipal
agencies' sole discretion, did not create a property interest. Id at 419-20.
56. 798 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1986). In Boucvalt, the Fifth Circuit considered
whether a physician's anesthesiology contract with a public hospital conferred
a constitutionally protected interest. Id. at 728-31. The court contrasted the
tenured public employment contract model of Roth and Sindermann with the
plaintiff's fixed term professional services contract, and indicated that the fac-
tors that supported a predeprivation hearing in Roth and Sindermann were
not present in Boucvalt. Id at 729-30. The factors included: the relative
wealth of the parties, the tenured employees' expectancy of permanent em-
ployment, and the lack of adequate compensation a public employee might re-
ceive in an action for damages. Id. at 729. The court then determined that due
process would be satisfied with a state post-deprivation breach of contract
claim. Id. at 730. In support of its determination that a post-deprivation rem-
edy was appropriate, the court cited Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44
(1981). See infra notes 79, 80, 83-85 and accompanying text. The court added
that if any predeprivation process was due, the pretermination notification the
plaintiff received and the plaintiff's attendance and presentation at two hospi-
tal board meetings met the minimal constitutional standards of notice and an
opportunity to respond. Boucvalt, 798 F.2d at 730. The court noted that
Boucvalt had notice of the Board's position and an adequate opportunity to re-
spond. Id.
57. Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that "[i]n
deciding whether a particular breach should be deemed a deprivation of prop-
erty we must bear in mind that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended
to shift the whole of the public law of the states into the federal courts").
58. S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 966 (2d Cir. 1988) (em-
phasizing that "the doctrinal implications of constitutionalizing all public con-
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Walentas, the Second Circuit, citing Brown and quoting S & D
Maintenance, expressed similar concern for the consequences
of federalizing all public contract rights.59
A few courts have been more direct and have identified the
logistical implications of federalizing public contract claims as
the basis for their anxiety. For example, in Reich v. Beharry,60
the Third Circuit noted judicial recognition that according due
process protection to breaches of public contracts would result
in "the federal courts [being] ... called upon to pass judgement
on the procedural fairness of the processing of a myriad of con-
tractual claims against public entities."''s
Judicial concern for state law federalization under section
1983 is not limited to contract claims. A substantial body of law
and commentary also has accumulated around judicial concern
for tort law federalization under section 1983.62 Although the
Supreme Court has not considered the issue of contract law
federalization, the Court has distinguished between a constitu-
tional tort and a state law tort. In Monroe v. Pape,63 Justice
Harlan noted that "a deprivation of a constitutional right is sig-
nificantly different from and more serious than a violation of a
state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even
though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the
deprivation of a constitutional right."' ' The Court later limited
availability of section 1983 as a remedy for government conduct
that is actionable as a tort. In Parratt v. Taylor,65 Justice
Rehnquist expressed concern that section 1983 "would make of
tract rights would raise substantial concerns and we seriously doubt that Roth
and its progeny portend such a result").
59. Walentas v. Lipper, 862 F.2d 414, 418 (2d Cir. 1988); see supra note 55
(discussing Walentas).
60. 883 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1989).
61. Id. at 242.
62. See, e.g., Bandes, Monell Parratt, Daniels, and Davidson: Distinguish-
ing a Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IowA L. REv.
101, 104 (1986) (arguing that Parratt v. Taylor may be used in conjunction with
Monell to distinguish effectively between state and constitutional torts);
Brown, De-Federalizing Common Law Torts: Empathy for Parratt, Hudson
and Daniels, 28 B.C.L. REV. 813, 816-17 (1987) (arguing that although the
Supreme Court has correctly, but unsuccessfully, attempted to limit applica-
tion of § 1983 to tort law, a reassessment of due process is necessary to prevent
tort law federalization); Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitu-
tional Torts, 85 MicH. L. RE,. 225, 225-26 (1986) (arguing that the language of
tort inadequately addresses harms caused by governmental institutions and
structures).
63. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
64. Id at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring).
65. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superim-
posed upon whatever systems may already be administered by
the States. '66
Congress and the Supreme Court nonetheless have explic-
itly recognized the desirability of section 1983 as a federal basis
for adjudicating constitutional claims.6 7 Justice Blackmun, in
66. rd at 544 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
67. In Parratt, the Court, determining that § 1983 was not limited to in-
tentional property deprivations, stated:
'[lit is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was
to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of preju-
dice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not
be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, priv-
ileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
might be denied by the state agencies.'
Id. at 534-35 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 180).
Reviewing the legislative history of § 1983 in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225 (1972), the Court noted that "Congress clearly conceived that it was alter-
ing the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the pro-
tection of federally created rights; it was concerned that state
instrumentalities could not protect those rights." Id at 242.
It is important to note that § 1983 provides a federal cause of action,
rather than federal jurisdiction, for violations of federal law pursuant to state
authority. See supra note 3. Although § 1983 is not a grant of federal jurisdic-
tion, Supreme Court decisions have indicated that plaintiffs are not required to
bring their cases in state forums. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S.
496, 506 (1982) (reviewing the legislative history of § 1983 and concluding that
Congress intended access to state and federal forums to be concurrent);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (stating that "[t]he federal remedy is
supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked"). Consequently, plaintiffs may
choose to bring § 1983 claims in either federal or state courts. This jurisdic-
tional option is significant because differences in forums may be advantageous
to individual plaintiffs and many appear to prefer federal court. See P. LOW &
J. JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
894 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing § 1983 jurisdiction options).
The intrusion of § 1983 into state judicial affairs highlights the jurisdic-
tional tension between state and federal courts. The Supreme Court has been
less than clear in its rulings on this issue. On one hand, the Court, relying on
its interpretation of the legislative history of § 1983, has indicated that § 1983
was intended to be an intrusive cause of action that operates outside of tradi-
tional notions of comity. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242; Monroe, 365 U.S. at
183. On the other hand, the Court has ignored the historical argument and in-
dicated that principles of comity and federal respect for state judicial func-
tions, should govern the federal-state judicial balance. See Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (holding that principles of comity preclude federal in-
tervention to enjoin state judicial action). The Court has historically vacillated
between these two positions. See Nichol, Federalism, State Courts, and Section
1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959, 961-62 (1987) (discussing the Court's inconsistency on
the intrusion-comity issue). Commentators have differed as to the appropri-
ateness of the Court's legislative analyses. Compare id. at 994 (concluding that
the circumstances of the enactment § 1983 support well the intrusive assertion
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his comment on section 1983, argues that criticism of section
1983 actions as burdening the federal courts is unpersuasive.68
He notes that such criticism is predicated on the assumption
that the suits are without merit, but sees no significant evi-
dence supporting this assumption.69 He appropriately notes
that section 1983 is only a vehicle for claims that are indepen-
dently grounded in state or federal law.70 Consequently, he
views complaints about its impact on federalism as "really...
complaints about the breadth of the underlying constitutional
rights."7 '
B. LIMITING DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Circuit court decisions in section 1983 cases often exten-
sively discuss the scope of protected interests. Courts voice
concern that extending constitutional protection to public con-
tracts would lead to the wholesale federalization of public con-
tract disputes.72 In discussing this concern, courts frequently
cite a defined group of cases for the proposition that not every
of federal power) with P. Low & J. JEFFRIES, supra, at 940 (expressing doubt
about the "relentless historicity" of the Court's § 1983 opinions). Despite these
shifting undercurrents, Mitchum and Monroe remain good law with respect to
the use of § 1983 as a federal cause of action to gain a federal forum.
68. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights





72. The circuit courts have expressed concern about extending protection
to property interests arising from public contracts. See, e.g., S & D Mainte-
nance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 966 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Brown for the prop-
osition that not all public contract property interests deserve protection);
Walentas v. Lipper, 862 F.2d 414, 418 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing S & D Maintenance
and echoing this concern); San Bernardino Physicians' Servs. Medical Group,
Inc. v. County of San Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404, 1408-10 (9th Cir. 1987) (rea-
soning that "[iut is neither workable nor within the intent of section 1983 to
convert every breach of contract claim against a state into a federal claim ....
[Tihe farther the purely contractual claim is from an interest as central to the
individual as employment, the more difficult it is to extend it constitutional
protection without subsuming the entire state law of public contracts"); Brown
v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that "[i]n deciding whether
a particular breach should be deemed a deprivation of property we must bear
in mind that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to shift the whole
of public law of the states into the federal courts"). Although courts have not
articulated clearly the feared consequences of constitutionalizing public con-
tract property rights, it is reasonable to surmise that their concern is logistical.
Their language may be fairly interpreted to imply apprehension with manag-
ing the large volume of claims that would be routed through the federal
courts. See supra notes 57-59.
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public contract property interest deserves due process protec-
tion.73 Although this entire group of cases has been decided in
favor of the defendant public entities, an analysis of these cases
reveals that none of them resolve the constitutionally protected
property issue in reaching a decision. Instead, the courts rely
on other well accepted limitations to the applicability of the
due process clause.74 The following subsections detail and dis-
cuss the due process limitations lower courts most frequently
employ.
1. Provision of Sufficient Due Process
A valid section 1983 claim depends on whether the plaintiff
has a protected property interest and actually has been de-
prived of adequate procedural due process.75 The difficulty in
assessing which contract rights constitute protectible property7 6
73. For example, San Bernardino Physicians' Servs. Medical Group, Inc. v.
County of San Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1987) is cited by the follow-
ing cases: Oceanside, (Nos. 88-5647, 88-6056) (9th Cir. June 1, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds library, CTA-9 file); Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Port of
Oakland, 869 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1989); Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239, 242
(3d Cir. 1989); Lagos v. Modesto City Schools Dist., 843 F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir.
1988); Walentas, 862 F.2d at 418; and S & D Maintenance, 844 F.2d at 967.
Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1983) is cited by the following
cases: Reich, 883 F.2d at 242; S & D Maintenance, 844 F.2d at 966; Walentas,
862 F.2d at 418; Yatvin v. Madison Metropolitan School Dist., 840 F.2d 412, 416
(7th Cir. 1988); and San Bernardino Physicians" 825 F.2d at 1408.
Casey v. DePetrillo, 697 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam) is cited by the
following cases: S & D Maintenance, 844 F.2d at 967; San Bernardino Physi-
cians', 825 F.2d at 1408; and Boucvalt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Serv. Dist.,
798 F.2d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 1986).
S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1988) is cited by
the following cases: Reich, 883 F.2d at 242 and Walentas, 862 F.2d at 418.
Costello v. Town of Fairfield, 811 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1987) is cited by the
following cases: Walentas, 862 F.2d at 418 and S & D Maintenance, 844 F.2d at
967.
Jimenez v. Almodovar, 650 F.2d 363 (1st Cir. 1981) is cited by the follow-
ing cases: S & D Maintenance, 844 F.2d at 967 and Casey, 697 F.2d at 23.
74. See infra notes 75-117 and accompanying text.
75. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (reasoning that "[o]nce it
is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is
due").
76. See, e.g., Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 582-
83 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that "[w]e need not decide here, however, whether or
not the provider's interest is just such a [property] right .... [E]ven assuming
a property right exists, we conclude that if the DSS notice was inadequate, it
was not so inadequate as to require the district court to grant preliminary in-
junctive relief"); Costello v. Town of Fairfield, 811 F.2d 782, 784 (2d Cir. 1987)
(noting that "[e]ven if we were to consider the increased benefits an entitle-
ment, we find no denial of due process because adequate post-deprivation rem-
edies were available to appellants"); Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 365 (7th
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has led courts to apply the second requirement to resolve sec-
tion 1983 claims.7 7 In particular, courts look to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Mathews v. Eldridge7s and Parratt v. Tay-
lor 79 to ascertain the adequacy of the state process provided.8 0
Cir. 1983) (noting that despite "our doubts that the alleged breach of contract
deprived the plaintiffs of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we need not resolve the issue, for there was in any event no de-
nial of due process").
77. For example, although asserting that not every contract property right
implicates due process, the Third Circuit in Reich observed the difficulty of de-
termining which contract property rights should be protected. Reich, 883 F.2d
at 242 (observing that "we, as well as many others, have found it difficult to
identify precisely which contract rights constitute protectible property inter-
ests ... and which do not"). Rather than attempt a determination, the court
reasoned that "it is unnecessary for us to undertake this difficult task of line-
drawing. Assuming, without deciding, that [the defendant] did deprive [the
plaintiff] of a protected property interest, we think it is clear that he had avail-
able to him all the process that was constitutionally due." I&; see also Plaza
Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 581-83 (2d Cir. 1989) (con-
cluding that post-termination submission of written arguments was sufficient
due process for clinical laboratory suspended from Medicaid program, even as-
suming a protected property interest); Costello v. Town of Fairfield, 811 F.2d
782, 784 (2d Cir. 1987) (assuming plaintiffs had a protected property interest,
adequate post-deprivation remedies were nonetheless available to retired po-
lice officers alleging deprivation of increased retirement benefits); Boucvalt v.
Board of Comm'rs, 798 F.2d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that post-depriva-
tion state court remedy employed by anesthesiologist provides sufficient due
process for hospital's breach of contract); Signet Constr. Corp. v. Borg, 775
F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1985) (reasoning that despite possession of a protected
property interest, a post-deprivation hearing provided sufficient due process
for contractor deprived of timely contract payment by city); Brown v. Brienen,
722 F.2d 360, 365 (7th Cir. 1983) (assuming a protected property interest, state
court action, rather than predeprivation hearing, is sufficient due process for
sheriff's department employees unable to take accrued compensatory time
off); Green v. Board of School Comm'rs, 716 F.2d 1191, 1193 (7th Cir. 1983)
(concluding that pretermination board hearing provided to dismissed school
bus driver was adequate for due process purposes); Casey v. Depetrillo, 697
F.2d 22, 23 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that school employees bringing
a § 1983 breach of employment contract claim did not allege deprivation of due
process and were entitled only to post-deprivation state tort remedy); Vanelli
v. Reynolds School Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 1982) (reasoning that
although possessing a protected property interest, a dismissed teacher with
one year contract received a post-termination hearing meeting due process
standards); Jimenez v. Almodovar, 650 F.2d 363, 370 (lst Cr. 1981) (holding
that tenured faculty member, terminated as a result of a program cancellation,
was afforded procedure satisfying due process requirements).
78. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
79. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
80. In Mathews, a state agency terminated the plaintiff's Social Security
disability insurance payments based on medical reports that the plaintiff's dis-
ability had ceased. 424 U.S. at 324-25. Instead of seeking reconsideration,
plaintiff sought immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a hearing. Rely-
ing an Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which established a right to an
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In Mathews, the Court, employing a three part test for as-
sessing the sufficiency of the process provided to a complainant,
determined that a predeprivation evidentiary hearing is not al-
ways required.81 Under Mathews, a court must weigh the im-
portance of the private interest that the governmental action
affects; the risk of erroneous deprivation and the extent to
which the contended procedure will reduce the risk of errone-
ous deprivation; and the government's interest in the action
along with the burden that requiring a predeprivation process
imposes on the government.8 2 In Parratt, the Court established
that post-deprivation remedies may be appropriate when
predeprivation process is impractical or impossible.8 3 In cases
in which a plaintiff's complaint centers on the lack of a
predeprivation evidentiary hearing, courts have applied Ma-
thews and Parratt and have found that post-deprivation hear-
evidentiary hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits, the plaintiff as-
serted that his right to due process required a pretermination hearing. Ma-
thews, 424 U.S. at 325. In reversing the lower court's decision for the plaintiff,
the Supreme Court established a three part test for determining what process
was due the plaintiff, rather than prescribing a predeprivation hearing as the
only adequate process. Id at 334-35. Applying the test, the Court determined
that an evidentiary hearing was not required prior to the termination of plain-
tiff's disability benefits, and the existing administrative procedures provided
adequate due process. Id at 348-49. Federal courts regularly apply the Ma-
thews test to actions asserting a lack of predeprivation due process. See, e.g.,
Reich, 883 F.2d at 242-43 (applying Mathews to an action against county con-
troller for refusing to pay special prosecutor fees and determining that
predeprivation process was not required); Brown, 722 F.2d at 365-66 (applying
Mathews to action against county for refusing to allow accrued compensatory
time off and determining that predeprivation process was not required).
In Parratt, the prison inmate plaintiff filed a § 1983 claim against prison
officials because prison employees had lost his personal property. 451 U.S. at
529. Although the main thrust of the court's holding in Parratt actually goes
to distinguishing between individual acts and state acts for due process pur-
poses, id. at 543, courts have seized on another aspect of the case. In its analy-
sis, the Parratt Court noted that, due to the random and unauthorized nature
of the property loss, requiring a predeprivation hearing would be both imprac-
ticable and impossible. Id, at 541. Invoking Mathews, the Supreme Court held
that available post-deprivation state tort remedies satisfied the due process re-
quirements, and thus the plaintiff had not stated a claim for relief under
§ 1983. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44. While recognizing that the fundamental re-
quirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner, the Court rejected the proposition that due pro-
cess always requires a predeprivation hearing. Id. at 540 (citing Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Federal courts regularly apply Parratt to ac-
tions asserting a lack of predeprivation due process. See, e.g., Brown, 722 F.2d
at 365.
81. See supra note 80.
82. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
83. See supra note 80.
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ings provide plaintiffs adequate due process.8 4 In essence,
courts using this approach dismiss section 1983 claims, reason-
ing that because an available post-deprivation hearing meets
due process requirements, the issue of whether a plaintiff pos-
sesses a protected property interest is therefore irrelevant.8 5
This approach differs from section 1983 cases in which the
plaintiff, while alleging a property deprivation, never effec-
tively asserts that the deprivation occurred without due pro-
cess.86 In these cases, courts generally concur that a due
process claim is absent.8 7
2. Discretionary Entitlement
In some cases, courts find no protected property interest
84. See, e.g., Reich, 883 F.2d at 242-43 (noting that cost to state, lack of
utility in reducing risk of error, and importance of plaintiff's interest in
predeprivation hearing fall short of requiring that such a process be mandated
constitutionally); Brown, 722 F.2d at 365-66 (citing Parratt and Mathews for
the proposition that a predeprivation hearing is not required in every case).
85. It should be noted that Parratt does not afford the wholesale elimina-
tion of § 1983 claims. See Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 1984)
(stating that "Parratt v. Taylor is not a magic wand that can make any section
1983 action resembling a tort suit disappear into thin air"). Parratt, read
broadly, may be interpreted to stand for the proposition that federal courts are
not available when state courts provide an adequate remedy. See Blackmun,
supra note 68, at 25. However, Parratt is limited in one important respect.
Parratt only applies to random and unauthorized acts by government officials
and not official policy. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541. Parratt is inapplicable when
official policy is challenged, see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush, 455 U.S. 422, 435-
36 (1982), and courts have accordingly declined to apply it in that circum-
stance. See, e.g., Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886, 891-93 (2d Cir. 1985) (de-
clining to apply Parratt when deprivation of prisoner's liberty was neither
random nor unauthorized); Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 509-10 (6th Cir.
1985) (declining to apply Parratt when prison policy, rather than unauthorized
and random action, caused deprivation of prisoner's book); Augustine v. Doe,
740 F.2d 322, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1984) (declining to apply Parratt and finding that
when the state is in a position to provide a predeprivation hearing, the availa-
bility of a post-deprivation tort remedy does not satisfy due process
requirements).
86. See San Bernardino Physicians' Servs. Medical Group, Inc. v. County
of San Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404, 1408 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting with approval
cases that dismissed contract-based § 1983 claims on the ground that the plain-
tiff essentially alleged breach of contract and not state procedural inadequacy);
see also Casey v. Depetrillo, 697 F.2d 22, 23 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (involv-
ing plaintiffs making no complaint of any procedural inadequacy and conced-
ing that the action was for simple breach of contract); Jimenez v. Almodovar,
650 F.2d 363, 369-70 (1st Cir. 1981) (reasoning that procedure available to, and
declined by, plaintiffs met procedural due process requirements and therefore
plaintiffs' complaint alleges no procedural inadequacy).
87. See, e.g., San Bernardino Physicians', 825 F.2d at 1408 n.3 (approving
dismissal of breach of contract cases not alleging separate due process injury).
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when the plaintiff has merely an expectation of an interest, the
realization of which is subject to the state's discretion.8 8 The
extent of the state's discretion in granting or denying a benefit
governs whether the plaintiff has a property interest.8 9 In par-
ticular, protection of expectation interests has been litigated in
cases involving state awards of zoning certification, licensure,
and contracts.9° Finding a property interest hinges not on the
certainty or likelihood of the award, but on the degree of dis-
cretion enjoyed by the issuing authority.91 Only when the dis-
cretion of the issuing authority is constrained significantly do
courts consider the likelihood of issuance.92 The decisions in
these cases are based directly on the Supreme Court's decisions
in Roth and Sindermann.9 3 The courts in these cases apply the
Roth standard that a person must have more than a unilateral
expectation of a benefit in order to claim a property interest.94
When the state has wide discretion to grant a benefit, a person
has no more than a unilateral expectation and consequently has
no property interest in the benefit.95
Similarly, courts have found that constitutionally protected
property arises when state statutes or contracts confer an inter-
est that cannot be terminated properly except for cause.96
88. See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911,
918-19 (2d Cir. 1989) (concluding developer's expectation of building permit
not protected by due process when regulator has wide discretion in granting
such permits); Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Port of Oakland, 869 F.2d 1322, 1325
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding real estate developer's "development project in princi-
ple" a mere expectation and therefore not entitled to constitutional
protection).
89. See, e.g., Walentas v. Lipper, 862 F.2d at 414, 419 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing
RR Village Ass'n, Inc. v. Denver Sewer Corp., 826 F.2d 1197, 1202 (2d Cir.
1987), and noting that when official action is truly discretionary, an interest in
a favorable decision is not a protected property interest); RRI Realty, 870 F.2d
at 918-20 (holding that regulator's broad discretion permits threshold rejection
of due process claims).
90. See supra note 88.
91. This approach provides the rationale for the court's decision in Three
Rivers Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 502 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa.
1980). In Three Rivers, the statutes controlling public cable television contract
bidding left little discretion to the awarding authority. Consequently, the con-
tract award was sufficiently likely to comprise a protected property interest.
Id. at 1131.
92. See RRI Realty, 870 F.2d at 918.
93. See, e.g., id, at 917-18 (citing Roth as the basis for the entitlement test);
Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).
94. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
95. See supra note 88.
96. See, e.g., Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 581
(2d Cir. 1989) (questioning whether medicaid contract is protected property).
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When the statute or the contract gives the state significant dis-
cretion to discontinue an interest, courts have determined that
no protected property interest exists. 97 In these cases, courts
usually analogize to the Supreme Court's decision in Bishop v.
Wood.98 In Bishop, the Court determined that a city ordinance
governing a police officer's employment, which did not limit
termination solely to cause, did not create a protected property
interest in continued employment.9 9 The Court limited "pro-
tected property" to those interests that the applicable entitling
statute defined as not revocable or terminable except "for
cause."100 Because contracts, as well as ordinances, can create
property interests, contracts that do not restrict their termina-
tion to cause have been held not to confer a protected property
interest. 10' Courts essentially determine that a contract termi-
nable at will confers no property interest on the party claiming
a breach. The courts, therefore, need not address whether the
97. Id. At-will termination makes the question of whether a contract con-
stitutes a protected property interest irrelevant because a contract terminable
at will is not sufficiently durable to be a protected property interest. See S &
D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 967-68 (2d Cir. 1988) (comparing
employment contract "for cause" termination provisions with plaintiff's meter
services contract and finding that a contract termination claim depends on
whether the contract's "for-cause [termination] provision [is] sufficient to cre-
ate a cognizable property interest").
98. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). For example, the Second Circuit, citing Bishop,
compared a maintenance contract to an employment contract to evaluate the
effect of "for-cause" termination provisions on protected property interests. S
& D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 902, 967 (2d Cir. 1988).
99. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344-47.
100. See id The Supreme Court determined that, although the city ordi-
nance controlling the discharge of permanent city employees prohibited termi-
nation except for specified reasons (cause), the petitioner's position was
essentially one of "at will employment." Id at 345. The Court found that the
ordinance may be construed as granting no right to continued employment but
merely conditioning an employee's removal on compliance with specified pro-
cedures. Id. The Court concluded that as a matter of state law the employee
"held his position at the will and pleasure of the city," and therefore had no
protected property interest. Id at 345 n.8. Bishop thus provides a basis for de-
termining that a plaintiff's interest may be held so insecurely as to not consti-
tute a protected property interest.
101. See, e.g., S & D Maintenance, 844 F.2d at 968 (reasoning that uncon-
ditional termination provision in contract for parking meter maintenance
defeats asserted property interest); Lagos v. Modesto Schools Dist., 843 F.2d
347, 348 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that public school teacher's interest in
coaching position was not a protected property interest due to unconditional
termination provision in state code); Bleeker v. Dukakis, 665 F.2d 401, 403 (1st
Cir. 1981) (holding nursing home administrator's employment contract termi-




alleged contract property interest is constitutionally protected,
because if no property interest exists, due process is not
required.102
3. Deprivation of Due Process Not Official Policy
In Monell v. Department of Social Services,10 3 the Supreme
Court determined that under section 1983, a municipality is not
vicariously liable for the acts of its employees, but is liable only
for interest deprivations pursuant to "official policy.' 0 4 The
Court's decision in Monell thus made clear that municipal lia-
bility under section 1983 rests on whether the government as
an entity inflicts the injury.10 5
The Supreme Court considered whether county employees'
warrantless search of a physician's clinic deprived the physician
102. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972) (stating that
requirements of due process apply only when government action deprives a
person of liberty or property).
103. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, the Supreme Court considered
whether a municipal policy requiring pregnant female employees to take med-
ically unnecessary leaves of absence deprived the employees of a protected
property right. Id at 662.
104. Id. at 690-91; see also supra note 22.
In accordance with Monell, courts hold that municipalities are liable only
for constitutional violations resulting from official policies and customs. Id. at
690-91. Courts recognize five methods of establishing the existence of a munic-
ipal policy or custom sufficient to impose municipal liability under § 1983. Ac-
tions taken by municipal legislative bodies constitute official policy. Pembaur
v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1980). Official policy exists when mu-
nicipal agencies or boards exercise authority delegated by the municipal legis-
lative body. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Actions by those with final authority
to make municipal decisions constitute official policy. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at
483-84. A government policy of inaction may constitute official policy. E.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 395-96 (indicating that the emerging consensus
in the lower courts is that "government inaction constitutes official policy only
if there is 'deliberate indifference' or 'callous disregard' amounting to a tacit
authorization or encouragement of the wrongful conduct"). Municipal custom
also may provide a basis for § 1983 liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. There is,
however, no judicial unanimity as to what constitutes a custom sufficient to
impose § 1983 liability. Some courts have defined custom in terms of well set-
tled practices, while others have found custom only where policy making offi-
cials have actual or constructive knowledge of the practice. E. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 3, at 398.
105. In Monell, the Court determined that:
[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury in-
flicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution
of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsi-
ble under § 1983.
436 U.S. at 694.
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of a protected interest in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati.0 6 Be-
cause the county prosecutor, a policy-making official, directed
the county employees' actions, the Court determined that the
physician had been deprived of a protected interest.0 7 The
Court, however, further limited municipal liability under sec-
tion 1983 to instances in which municipal officials possessing fi-
nal policy-making authority deliberately act to deprive the
plaintiff of a protected interest. 0 8
Since Monell, courts have recognized municipal liability
under section 1983.109 In accordance with Pembaur, municipal
liability subsequently has been limited to protected interest
deprivations occurring as a result of official policy."10 Since
Pembaur, at least one court has determined that a municipality
has no liability when the alleged due process deprivation does
not result from "official policy."111 '
The Eighth Circuit considered whether a city manager's
unilateral alteration of a zoning map deprived a shopping
center developer of protected property in Westborough Mall,
Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau.1 2 Relying on Pembaur,113 the
106. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
107. Id at 484-85.
108. I& at 481-84. In Pembaur, county deputy sheriffs forcibly entered the
plaintiff's clinic in search of two of the plaintiff's employees. The deputy
sheriffs entered without a warrant under order of the county prosecutor. I&
at 472-73. The plaintiff was convicted of obstructing police for his refusal to
permit entry to his clinic. Id The plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim, alleging
that the county employees' warrantless entry in search of third parties vio-
lated his rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. I&. at 474. Be-
cause the entry appeared to be an isolated occurrence, rather than a part of an
established policy, the circuit court dismissed the claim against the county. Id
at 476-77. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that under § 1983, even a sin-
gle action by a policy-maker could expose a municipality to liability. Id at 480-
81. The Court then qualified its position:
[We hasten to emphasize that not every decision by municipal of-
ficers automatically subjects the municipality to § 1983 liability. Mu-
nicipal liability attaches only where the decision-maker possesses final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action or-
dered. The fact that a particular official - even a policy-making offi-
cial - has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not,
without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of
that discretion .... The official must also be responsible for establish-
ing final government policy respecting such activity before the munic-
ipality can be held liable.
Id at 481-83.
109. See, e.g., id at 471.
110. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
111. Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 710 F. Supp. 1278,
1282 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
112. 794 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1986).
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Eighth Circuit remanded the case for a determination of
whether the city manager's actions constituted official policy." 4
On remand, the Westborough district court found that the city
council possessed final policy making authority for zoning deci-
sions; therefore the city manager acted unofficially and the mu-
nicipality was not liable."15 Consequently, a determination of
the property interest's protected status is irrelevant if no offi-
cial policy is found." 6
C. CORPORATE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
The Supreme Court has established that corporations are
"persons" for fourteenth amendment purposes.117 In Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,118 the Court considered whether a state could
statutorily compel children to attend only public schools.'1 9
The Society of Sisters, a corporation operating a private school,
contested the statute.120 Refuting the state's contention that
corporations, not being natural persons, could not avail them-
selves of fourteenth amendment due process protection, the
Court determined that corporations were entitled to fourteenth
amendment protection of business and property.121
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a
state statute restricting a corporation's political speech to only
113. 474 U.S. at 481-83; see supra notes 106-09.
114. 794 F.2d at 339. In Westborough, a mall developer sued the city and its
officials for erroneously changing the zoning of its proposed development. The
city manager unilaterally changed the zoning map and announced the change
to the press without city council approval. The zoning change caused the de-
veloper to lose prospective tenants and to halt development. Subsequently, an-
other developer succeeded in acquiring development zoning for a different plot
of land and constructed a shopping mall. Id- at 332-35.
115. Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 710 F. Supp. 1278,
1282 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
116. Id. The court found it unnecessary to consider whether plaintiff's in-
terest rose to the level of a protected property interest.
117. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.15 (1978) (citing
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886)); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (refuting claim that fourteenth
amendment due process protection is available only to natural persons and as-
serting that corporations may claim fourteenth amendment due process pro-
tection for business and property); see also Old Dominion Dairy v. Secretary of
Defense, 631 F.2d 953, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that a corporation has the
same federal due process protections as an individual with regard to
contracts).
118. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
119. Id. at 529-31.
120. Id. at 531-32.
121. Id. at 523, 535.
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those issues that materially affect its business in First Natl
Bank v. Bellotti. 2 2 The Court held the first and fourteenth
amendments protect corporate political speech.123 The Court
asserted that the Constitution limits the states' ability to deter-
mine a corporation's rights,' 4 cautioning that if states could re-
strict corporate rights in such fashion, corporations could be
denied the protection of all constitutional guarantees, including
due process and equal protection.125 This analysis implies that
corporations are entitled to due process rights without state
abridgement.126 Although courts occasionally use corporate
identity as a basis for denying corporations certain constitu-
tional rights, the Supreme Court has determined that corpora-
tions should be denied only those rights that are "purely
personal" or that have been established by historic prece-
dent.127 Ample precedent supports Bellotti's holding affording
corporations due process protection.12S
122. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
123. ML at 778-84.
124. 1& at 778-79 n.14.
125. Id at 779 n.14. Although corporations are creatures of state law, if
state law governed all corporate rights, corporations might be deprived of all
constitutional guarantees. This would diminish significantly the social and
economic utility of the corporation. Such a rule also would conflict with ex-
isting decisions holding state laws invalid when they disagree with constitu-
tional guarantees. See, e.g., id at 778-79 n.14 (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448, 464 (1976) (standing for the proposition that the fourteenth amend-
ment protects corporate speech); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977) (concerning fifth amendment double jeopardy); G.M.
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977) (discussing fourth
amendment)).
126. See infra note 184.
127. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779 n.14. In assessing which constitutional guaran-
tees extend to corporations, the Court in Bellotti distinguished between cases
involving due process and equal protection and those involving "purely per-
sonal" guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
and the right to privacy. ML "Purely personal" guarantees are unavailable to
corporations because the guarantees' historic function has been limited to indi-
vidual protection. I& at 779 n.14 (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694,
698-701 (1944)). The Court further considered the nature, history, and purpose
of the particular constitutional provisions when evaluating the constitutional
protections available to corporations. I& at 779 n.14.
128. See, e.g., Browning - Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2909, 2925-26 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(distinguishing due process, as a constitutional right enjoyed by corporations,
from other rights not enjoyed by corporations); Helicopteros Nacionales v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14, 418-19 (1984) (holding nonresident corporation's con-
tacts with forum state insufficient to submit corporation to in personam juris-
diction); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779-80 n.14-15 (implying that corporation is a
"person" possessing fourteenth amendment rights of due process and equal
protection); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (finding that
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Federal appellate courts also have determined regularly
that corporations possess due process rights.129 In Old Domin-
ion Dairy v. Secretary of Defense,130 the D.C. Circuit held that
a dairy had a cognizable liberty interest and was entitled to
challenge, on due process grounds, the government's actions de-
priving it of government contracts. 131 In Northeast Georgia Ra-
diological Associates, P.C v. Tidwell,13 2 the Fifth Circuit found
that a professional corporation was entitled to challenge loss of
medical staff privileges on due process grounds.133
The process of defining what constitutes a "constitutionally
protected property interest," therefore, is currently one of ex-
clusion, achieved through piecemeal litigation of section 1983
claims. Courts employ various exclusory mechanisms to avoid
reaching the issue of whether due process protects public con-
tract rights. In San Bernardino Physicians', however, the
Ninth Circuit directly confronted that issue.
II. SAN BERNARDINO PHYSICIANS':
A SIGNIFICANT BREAK
In 1980, San Bernardino Physicians' Services Medical
Group, a California professional corporation, contracted with
the San Bernardino County supervisors to provide professional
medical services to the county hospital.1' The parties could
terminate the contracts only "for cause."'135 In May, 1981,
within the contracts' terms, the county notified the Group that
corporations may claim, and the Court will support, fourteenth amendment
protection for business and property); Signet Constr. Corp. v. Borg, 775 F.2d
486, 489 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that contracting corporation's right to timely
payment is a property interest that due process protects); Northeast Ga. Radio-
logical Assoc., P.C. v. Tidwell, 670 F.2d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that
professional corporation in contract dispute is entitled to assert due process
claim).
129. See, e.g., Old Dominion Dairy v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953, 962
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that a corporation has the same constitutional due
process protections as an individual with regard to contracts); Tidwell, 670 F.2d
at 512 (stating that professional corporation in contract dispute is entitled to
assert due process claim).
130. 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
131. Id. at 962.
132. 670 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1982).
133. Id. at 512.
134. San Bernardino Physicians' Servs. Medical Group, Inc. v. County of
San Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987).
135. Id. at 1406. In addition, the contracts required the terminating party
to give notice within 120 days of the breach prompting the decision to termi-




the county would terminate the contracts in the fall.1 3 6 After
rescinding the termination notification, county employees and
the board harassed the Group's employees, threatened to termi-
nate the contracts prematurely, and systematically impeded the
Group's practice. 37
In December, 1981, the Group sued the county and the
board of supervisors in federal court under section 1983, alleg-
ing deprivation of property without due process.'38 In 1982, the
Group allowed one contract to expire and terminated the other
contract approximately 18 months before its expiration date. 3 9
The district court assumed for its ruling that the defendants
materially breached the contracts in an effort to frustrate the
Group's performance, and that the breaches justified the
Group's premature contract termination. 40 The district court,
however, determined that a government contract, alone, could
not create constitutionally protected property without state or
local laws to supplement the contractual rights.' 4 '
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, while recognizing that gov-
ernment contracts can indeed create constitutionally protected
property interests,142 made a significant break from previous
cases 143 and held that a property interest derived from a corpo-
rately held public contract is not entitled to constitutional pro-
tection.144 In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit directly addressed
most of the approaches used by other courts to dismiss section
1983 claims involving public contract rights. The court noted
that other courts dismiss these claims if the plaintiff fails to al-
lege a separate due process claim, but merely alleges that the
136. . at 1406.
137. Id. The Physicians' Group challenged the termination in state court
on the basis that the county had ignored the contracts' termination only "for
cause" provision. The board of supervisors rescinded the termination notices
before trial. Id. After rescinding the notices, the county delayed payments
owed to the Group, conducted overly intrusive record audits, and refused to




141. The district court granted the county defendants' alternative motions
for summary judgment or directed verdict. The Ninth Circuit treated the dis-
trict court's order as a summary judgment. Id. at 1406 n.2.
142. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the district court's conclusion that
"contractual rights alone cannot create property interests protected by the
Due Process Clause" was "contrary to federal and state decisions holding that
contracts may create protected property interests." Id at 1407.
143. See supra notes 76-77.
144. San Bernardino Physicians', 825 F.2d at 1409-10.
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contract has been breached.1 45 The court recognized, however,
that the Group's claims did allege a separate procedural inade-
quacy, and thus was distinguishable from this line of cases.1 46
The court also determined that the case could not be re-
solved by determining whether the Group either received ap-
propriate process or could have received it through a post-
deprivation remedy.1 47 Additionally, the court noted that appli-
cation of post-deprivation due process still would require deter-
mining whether the Group's contracts were fundamentally
different from the tenured employment contracts protected
under Roth and Sindermann.148 Although the court did not
consider applying the official policy approach to dispose of the
case, such an approach likely would be inapplicable because the
board of supervisors, the highest policy-making group in the
county, allegedly breached the contracts.
Claiming the unavailability of these commonly applied op-
tions for resolving this type of case, the court seized upon a new
approach to dismiss the section 1983 claim. Recognizing that
federal constitutional law necessarily determines whether a
contractually derived property interest rises to a level of enti-
tlement worthy of due process clause protection, 49 the court
held that a corporate public contract to provide professional
medical services did not confer a protected property interest.150
145. Id at 1408 n.3 (characterizing some of the Group's allegations as
claims of deprivation without due process).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1410 n.6.
148. Id. at 1410 n.7. The court's reasoning here is disingenuous. Although
noting that resolving the case through a post-deprivation remedy, an existing
mechanism, would require it to determine that Physicians' Group's contracts
were fundamentally different from tenured employment contracts, the court
nonetheless determined the contracts to be fundamentally different in order
to employ its own test. Id. at 1409-10. If determining that the contracts are
fundamentally different is the necessary predicate to employing either an ex-
isting case resolution mechanism or a new mechanism, the court's develop-
ment of its own test appears unnecessary.
149. San Bernardino Physicians" 825 F.2d at 1409 (quoting Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)); see also infra note 187 and
accompanying text.
150. San Bernardino Physicians' at 1409-10. The court distinguished the
San Bernardino Physicians' medical services contract from the employment
contracts in Roth and Sindermann because the San Bernardino Physicians'
contract did not involve individual employment, even though it was a contract
to provide personal services. Id. at 1409. The court found that, unlike the
plaintiffs in Roth and Sindermann, the Group's employees could not achieve a
secure tenure-like position as a result of the county contract. Id. In addition,
the Group acted as a supplier and not an employee. Id
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Arguing that some contract property interests are more worthy
of constitutional protection than others, the court, citing
Brown, identified the crucial distinguishing factors as the secur-
ity with which the interest is held under state law, and its im-
portance to the holder as an individual. 151 The court held up
individual employment contracts as the model best embodying
these factors.15 2 The court refused to assert, however, that indi-
vidual employment contracts were the only contracts entitled
to due process protection.153 Rather, it claimed only to offer in-
dividual employment contracts as a guide for determining
whether a contractual property interest rises to the level of a
151. Id. at 1409 (quoting Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 364 (7th Cir.
1983)). Using Brown and generalizing from the plaintiffs' situations in Roth
and Sindermann, the court created a two part test from what it perceived to
be the essential attributes of protected employment contracts. Id. at 1469. In
Brown, the court determined in dicta that the attributes of an interest that
warrant the protection of the fourteenth amendment were the "security with
which [the interest] is held under state law and its importance to the holder."
Brown, 722 F.2d at 364. The San Bernardino Physicians' court adopted this
test and embellished it by focusing on the importance of the interest to the
holder as an individual. 825 F.2d at 1409. The court then asserted that indi-
vidual rights, particularly those related to the deprivation of employment, re-
ceive greater protection under § 1983 than other contractual rights. Id.
152. San Bernardino Physicians, 825 F.2d at 409. When attempting to de-
termine which contract property interests should be protected, other courts, as
well as the Ninth Circuit, sometimes retreat to the Supreme Court employ-
ment cases that support modern due process law. See, e.g., Boucvalt v. Board
of Commr's, 798 F.2d 722, 729 (5th Cir. 1986) (comparing Boucvalt's contract
with the employment contract of Roth and Sindermann). Because Roth and
Sindermann involve decisions finding that employment contracts can create
protected property interests, courts sometimes use employment relationships
as a touchstone when attempting to discern whether protection should be ex-
panded to other types of contract property interests. As a result, courts rely
on employment contract attributes to restrict the broader language of the
Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d
962, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1988) (declining to recognize contract interests extending
beyond the context of Goldberg and Roth); San Bernardino Physicians', 825
F.2d at 1409 (identifying employment contracts as the prime constitutionally
protected contract category); Boucvalt, 798 F.2d at 729 (confining the Roth and
Sindermann decisions to tenured public employment contracts).
153. San Bernardino Physicians" 825 F.2d at 1409. Indeed, the court could
not hold that only employment contracts are entitled to protection given the
variety of property found to be entitled to due process protection. See supra
notes 14-19 and accompanying text. In asserting that "employment contracts
are not the only kind [of contracts] that may be entitled to Fourteenth
Amendment protection," the court cited Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422, 430 (1982), for the proposition that due process protects other types of
state secured entitlements. Logan, however, deals with state statutory entitle-
ments (employee's statutory right to use Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Act procedures), not contractually derived claims. 455 U.S. at 430-33.
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protected interest.M The court applied the second part of its
test, "the importance of the interest to the holder as an indi-
vidual,"155 and determined that due process did not protect the
Group's medical services contract, because as a corporate con-
tract, it was not sufficiently similar to an individually held em-
ployment contract. 56 Although the court recognized that
corporations are entitled to due process protection in other ar-
eas, 157 the court interpreted Bellotti to hold that when a prop-
erty interest represented an individual concern like the right to
privacy, due process protection was not available to corpora-
tions, 5 8 and therefore a corporate contract did not confer a
constitutionally protected property interest. 59 In justifying
this holding, the court explicitly emphasized its concerns about
the danger of federalizing all public contract rights.1 60
The Ninth Circuit subsequently decided Oceanside Golf In-
stitute, Inc. v. City of Oceanside.16 1 In Oceanside, an unpub-
154. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "the farther the purely contractual
claim is from an interest as central to the individual as employment, the more
difficult it is to extend it constitutional protection without subsuming the en-
tire state law of public contracts." 825 F.2d at 1409-10.
155. Id. at 1409 (emphasis in original).
156. The court concluded:
[The] Physicians' Group attempts to analogize its contracts to ones of
employment .... But the analogy fails .... Physicians' Group did not
itself become employed as an individual would; it was not capable of
doing so .... Yet the farther the purely contractual claim is from an
interest as central to the individual as employment, the more difficult
it is to extend it constitutional protection without subsuming the en-
tire state law of public contracts. We find nothing in Physicians'
Group's contract that confers an interest equal to those contractual
interests that have been afforded constitutional protection in the past,
or that ought to be afforded it now.
Id. at 1409-10.
157. Id- at 1407.
158. Id. at 1409 n.4 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779
n.14 (1978) for the assertion that "[w]hether or not a particular guarantee is
'purely personal' or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason de-
pends on the nature, history, or purpose of the particular constitutional
provision").
159. Id, at 1410.
160. The court acknowledged that "[it may well be that the requirements
of federalism have more to do with the line we draw than the shadings of con-
tract entitlement doctrine." Id. at 1410; see also id at 1408 n.3 (noting that
"[o]ur decision not to affirm summarily on the ground that the case is at bot-
tom one for breach of contract does not mean that we minimize the danger of
federalizing state contract law. As our text indicates, that concern underlies
our holding that Physicians' Group's contract confers no federally protected
entitlement").




lished opinion, the Ninth Circuit, relying solely on San
Bernardino Physicians', determined that a corporation's devel-
opment contract and lease with a municipality are not pro-
tected property interests. 162 The court reiterated the test it
developed in San Bernardino Physicians', and found that the
corporation's contracts were not protected by due process be-
cause they were too dissimilar to individual employment con-
tracts.163 Although San Bernardino Physicians' may seem like
an anomaly, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Oceanside may fore-
cast San Bernardino Physicians' potential for expanded
application.
III. PRECEDENT AND FEDERALISM DO NOT SUPPORT
THE SAN BERNARDINO PHYSICLANS' DECISION
A. LACK OF SUPPORTING PRECEDENT
The San Bernardino Physicians' court couched its position
within the context of Brown 16 and other cases emphasizing the
problem of federalizing all public breach of contract cases.165 It
is important to note that none of the precedent directly decided
the issue of whether corporate public contract property inter-
ests should be granted constitutional protection. 66
162. Id at 1-10.
163. The San Bernardino Physicians' contract, although not an individual
employment contract, indirectly involved employment of the group's physi-
cians. 825 F.2d at 1405-06, 1409. The Oceanside contract involved the lease and
development of real estate. (Nos. 88-5647, 88-6056) (9th Cir. June 1, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds library, CTA-9 file) at 3. The court compared Ocean-
side's contract to the San Bernardino Physicians' service contract and to em-
ployment contracts, and found that Oceanside's contractual claim was even
less similar to an employment contract than the contract in San Bernardino.
1d, at 7. The court found the Oceanside contract even more analogous to a typ-
ical construction contract than the San Bernardino Physicians' contract and,
therefore, did not confer a constitutionally protected property interest on the
developer. I& at 7-8.
164. San Bernardino Physicians; 825 F.2d at 1408.
165. See id.; see also supra notes 57-116 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 366-67 (7th Cir. 1983) (hold-
ing that the county's alleged breach of an employment contract did not consti-
tute a denial of substantive due process, nor was county's failure to provide a
"pre-deprivation" administrative hearing a denial of procedural due process).
The Seventh Circuit, although discussing at great length whether breach of
the employees' contract constituted a deprivation of constitutionally protected
property, decided that the issue need not be resolved because plaintiffs were
not denied due process. Id at 363-65.
Although the Brown discussion about property interests is dicta, courts
frequently cite Brown for the proposition that a breach of a public contract
does not constitute a deprivation of constitutionally protected property. See,
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Reviewing the major cases that address the issue of
whether breach of a corporate public contract implicates due
process reveals that, despite the rhetoric,16 7 none of the cases,
other than San Bernardino Physicians' and Oceanside, actually
decide the issue.168 After often lengthy discussions concerning
the potential problems of federalizing breach of public contract
claims, the courts nonetheless decide the cases on other
grounds.169 The federalism concerns expressed by the courts
therefore might be characterized as dicta. This pattern greatly
compromises the precedential value of these cases in assessing
the appropriateness of protecting corporate contract property
interests.17 0
Additionally, the two fundamental propositions in the San
Bernardino Physicians' opinion, the individual nature of due
process protection and the individual employment contract
model for constitutionally protected property, lack adequate
precedent.
e.g., Walentas v. Lipper, 862 F.2d 414, 418 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Brown for dis-
tinguishing "between the breach of an ordinary contract right and the depriva-
tion of a protectible property interest within the meaning of the due process
clause"); S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1988)
(using Brown as another example in which the Court of Appeals has "been re-
luctant to surround the entire body of public contract rights with due process
protections"); San Bernardino Physicians' 825 F.2d at 1408-09 (citing Brown
for the proposition that Congress did not intend § 1983 to convert every breach
of contract claim against a state into a federal claim).
167. See supra note 72.
168. See supra notes 72-116 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 57-116 and accompanying text.
170. Dictum is a court's expression or statement regarding a matter either
unrelated, or unnecessary, to the case's holding. BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY
409 (5th ed. 1979). Although it may be persuasive, courts generally are not
bound by dictum as authority or precedent for purposes of stare decisis. 20 AM.
JUR. 2d Courts § 74, 190 (1965). The Supreme Court has indicated that ques-
tions that a court has neither considered nor ruled on should not be considered
as precedent. KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 279 (1936) (citing
Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) for the proposition that "[q]uestions
which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court
nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to consti-
tute precedents"). This is especially true when the dictum relates to a ques-
tion that the court expressly refuses to decide. Brehm v. Hennings, 70 Ind.
App. 625, 631, 123 N.E. 821, 823 (1919) (rejecting case authority when the court
did not decide the issue in question). Discussions in Brown, and other cases
addressing which property interests are entitled to constitutional protection,
thus would be entitled to significant precedential weight if the courts actually
had decided the issue. Because the courts did not decide this issue explicitly,
the precedential value of these cases is lessened considerably.
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1. The Employment Model and Other Contracts
If followed by other courts, the San Bernardino Physi-
cians' decision would effectively restrict protected property sta-
tus to those contracts that are indistinguishable from
individually held employment contracts.1 71 This approach con-
flicts with the Supreme Court's direction in Roth and
Sindermann that property interests subject to procedural due
process are "not limited by a few rigid, technical forms."'172
The Court has found that the range of due process protected
property interests extends "well beyond actual ownership of
real estate, chattels, or money,"'173 and "denotes a broad range
of interests that are secured by 'existing rules and understand-
ings.' "174 Although the Court recognizes that the due process
clause does not protect all property interests,1 5 in light of the
expansive language used to construe protected property inter-
ests,176 it seems unlikely that the Court would restrict narrowly
the applicability of so basic a constitutional right to only em-
ployment-like contracts. Indeed, the subsequent restrictions
that the Court has imposed to determine which property inter-
ests are protected all operate to more closely define the secur-
ity with which the property interest is held,177 rather than to
any notion of the importance or nature of the interest.178
171. Applying the "duck test", the Ninth Circuit, consistent with Goldberg,
presumably would be willing to recognize certain welfare benefits as similar
enough to employment to be entitled to due process protection. Beyond these
benefits, however, it is difficult to ascertain if any other contract interests
would quack loudly enough to receive protection.
172. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (citing Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972)); see also supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
173. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-72.
174. Sindermnann, 408 U.S. at 601.
175. See supra note 28.
176. See supra notes 26, 33, 36 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 42, 78-80, 100, 103-15 and accompanying text.
178. The threshold requirement of security contrasts with the Court's will-
ingness to consider the nature and the importance of the property interest to
subsequently determine what process is due. In determining what process is
due, the Court recognizes that "due process is flexible and calls for such proce-
dural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The Court employs a balancing test, considering the
following factors: (1) the private interest that official action will affect; (2)
"the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional ... procedural safeguards;"
and (3) "the Government's interest, including ... fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would en-
tail." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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2. Corporate and Individual Due Process Rights
The San Bernardino Physicians' court inappropriately re-
lied on dicta in Brown to establish a test for determining which
public contract property interests are protected. 79 The court
examined two factors: "the security with which [the interest] is
held under state law,"'8s0 and "the importance of the interest to
the holder as an individual."''s
The first factor fits well within the Roth and Sindermann
framework. Roth and Sindermann both identify the security
with which the party holds the interest as essential when defin-
ing a protected property's existence. 8 2 In fact, the major pa-
rameters established by the Supreme Court all are criteria used
in determining the security with which an interest is held. 8 3
The second part of the test, however, conflicts with well es-
tablished precedent. The court's individualization of constitu-
tional due process protection is inconsistent with ample
precedent affording due process rights to corporations. 8 4 The
179. San Bernardino Physicians' at 1408-09 (quoting Brown, 722 F.2d at
364). The court relied on Brown for the proposition that not every interfer-
ence with contractual expectations creates a § 1983 claim. Id. at 1408. In em-
ploying this proposition, the court quotes Brown's admonition that "we must
bear in mind that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to shift the
whole of public law of the states into the federal courts." Id at 1408. The
court then fashioned its two part test from Brown's essential due process at-
tributes: "the security with which [the interest] is held under state law and its
importance to the holder." Id at 1409 (quoting Brown, 722 F.2d at 364). The
court inappropriately relied on Brown because Brown's discussion of due pro-
cess property interests is dictum. See supra notes 72, 76 and accompanying
text.
180. San Bernardino Physicians" 825 F.2d at 1409 (quoting Brown, 722 F.2d
at 364). In Roth and Sindermann, the Supreme Court determined that a party
must hold securely an interest in order to qualify for constitutional protection.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1977); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 601 (1977); see also supra notes 33, 42 and accompanying text. Subse-
quent Supreme Court cases endeavored to define more precisely the "securely
held interest" concept. See supra notes 78-80, 100, 103-08 and accompanying
text.
181. San Bernardino Physicians', 825 F.2d at 1409 (emphasis in original);
see also supra note 152.
182. Roth and Sindermann both identify the security with which an inter-
est is held as a significant factor in ascertaining whether the interest is consti-
tutionally protected. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77; Sindernann, 408 U.S. at 601.
183. See supra notes 26, 33, 38 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (holding
that a corporation is a "person" entitled to fourteenth amendment rights of
due process and equal protection); Signet Constr. Corp. v. Borg, 775 F.2d 486,
489 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that contracting corporation's right to timely
payment is a property interest that due process protects); Northeast Ga. Radio-
logical Assoc., P.C. v. Tidwell, 670 F.2d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that a
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court's evaluation of Bellotti is incomplete. Although Bellotti
noted that certain constitutional rights, such as the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corpo-
rations because they are purely personal or historically re-
stricted, Bellotti distinguished these restricted rights from those
that are available to corporations, notably due process and
equal protection.185 Bellotti stands for the proposition that pos-
session of certain constitutional rights, as opposed to the appli-
cation of rights already possessed, may be unavailable to
corporations. 186
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit seeks to impose a rule of
"comparable value" for determining due process protection eli-
gibility. Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, a corporate public
contract, no matter how securely held, would never be entitled
to due process protection unless it became, in some fashion, as
socially valuable as an individual employment contract. 8 7 Em-
ploying the second part of the San Bernardino Physicians'
court's test evaluating the importance of the interest to the
holder, it is difficult to distinguish between the importance of
employment to an individual and the importance of a medical
services contract to a corporation, without also assuming that
corporations (and their employees) are less entitled than indi-
viduals to due process protection of the means of economic live-
lihood. The logical outcome of this approach would require any
professional corporation in contract dispute is entitled to assert a due process
claim).
185. In a footnote, quoted in part by the San Bernardino Physicians' court,
825 F.2d at 1409, the Bellotti Court distinguished purely personal constitutional
guarantees from those, like due process, that are available to corporations:
Corporate identity has been determinative in several decisions deny-
ing corporations certain constitutional rights, such as the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination... but this is not because the
States are free to define the rights of their creatures without constitu-
tional limit. Otherwise, corporations could be denied the protection of
all constitutional guarantees, including due process and the equal pro-
tection of the laws. Certain "purely personal" guarantees, such as the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to
corporations and other organizations because the "historic function"
of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of indi-
viduals. Whether or not a particular guarantee is "purely personal"
or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason depends on the
nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779 n.14 (citations omitted).
186. Id. at 778-79 n.14; see also supra note 127.
187. "[IThe farther the purely contractual claim is from an interest as cen-
tral to the individual as employment, the more difficult it is to extend it con-
stitutional protection without subsuming the entire state law of public
contracts." San Bernardino Physicians', 825 F.2d at 1409-10.
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individual desiring due process protection for a livelihood de-
rived from a public entity to either be employed by, or contract
directly with, the public entity.
The inapplicability of the San Bernardino Physicians' test
becomes apparent if the individual plaintiffs in Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Division v. Craft88 are replaced, hypothetically,
with a corporate plaintiff. In Memphis Light, the Supreme
Court determined that a public utility's termination of service
without cause deprived the plaintiffs of a protected property
right.'- 9 In light of precedent establishing that a corporation is
entitled to due process protection, it is difficult to justify deny-
ing a corporation a protected property right in continued utility
service (a contractual relationship not terminable except for
cause under state law) solely because it is a corporation rather
than an individual.190
The contested contract in San Bernardino Physicians' was
intended to provide professional medical services.191 The only
difference between this type of contract and a personal employ-
ment contract is the interposition of a corporation between the
county and the physician employees. It is difficult to imagine
what type of corporate contract would be any more similar to
188. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
189. In Memphis Light, the defendant utility company terminated the
plaintiffs' utility service five times in one year due to the defendant utility
company's erroneous double billing. Id at 4-5. In each case, the utility com-
pany never apprised the plaintiffs of remedial administrative procedures avail-
able to them. Id at 5. Plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action alleging termination
of utility service without due process. I&i at 3. The Court found that the plain-
tiffs had a protectible property interest in continued utility service because
Tennessee law only permits a utility to terminate service "for cause" when a
utility bill is the subject of a bona fide dispute. Id. at 11-12.
In its decision, the Court emphasized its finding in Roth:
The Fourteenth Amendment places procedural constraints on the ac-
tions of government that work a deprivation of interests enjoying the
stature of "property" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
Although the underlying substantive interest is created by "an in-
dependent source such as state law," federal constitutional law deter-
mines whether that interest rises to the level of a "legitimate claim of
entitlement" protected by the Due Process Clause.
Id at 9 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)).
In Memphis Light, the Court equated protected property with a substan-
tive interest that is not subject to termination at will. Memphis Light, 436 U.S.
at 11-12. The Court's decision in Memphis Light thus expands this concept be-
yond the employment context of Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 349-50
(1976).
190. Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 1405.
191. Id- at 1405-06.
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an individual employment contract, and yet not deserve due
process protection. Despite asserting that its holding does not
preclude corporations from invoking section 1983 to protect
their purely contractual rights,192 and that employment con-
tracts are not the only type amenable to fourteenth amendment
protection,193 the court's holding effectively acts as a categorical
bar to due process protection of corporate public contracts.
B. Do FEDERALISM CONCERNS JUSTIFY FURTHER
RESTRICTIONS ON SECTION 1983?
The Ninth Circuit's holding in San Bernardino Physicians'
is grounded in its fear of federalizing state contract law.194
The court admits that the "requirements of federalism," more
than the "shadings of contract entitlement doctrine," compel its
approach.195 The problems inherent in the court's approach
suggest that the court developed the San Bernardino Physi-
cians' test merely as a means of resisting a federalism
bogeyman.
Federalism concerns are insufficient to justify imposing a
categorical bar on enforcing corporate due process rights in
contract cases. Based on the relative infrequency of reported
cases, the number of corporations seeking due process protec-
tion for nonemployment contracts appears small.196 The infre-
192. Id at 1410.
193. Id. at 1409.
194. San Bernardino Physicians" 825 F.2d at 1408 n.3; see also supra note
72 and accompanying text.
195. San Bernardino Physicians' at 1410.
196. The cases cited in this Comment appear to constitute a significant por-
tion of corporate contract due process cases. Westlaw searches for reported
cases citing leading public contract due process cases yield surprisingly few
similar cases. For example, as of January 1990, only 58 reported federal cases
in a 7 year period cite Brown v. Brienen, only 9 reported federal cases in a one
and one half year period cite S & D Maintenance v. Goldin, and only 15 re-
ported federal cases in a two and one half year period cite San Bernardino
Physicians'. Additionally, a number of citing cases either are not § 1983 cases
or do not involve corporate public contracts. For example, of the 15 cases cit-
ing San Bernardino Physicians', one case did not implicate § 1983: Brinkman
v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263, 265 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing San Bernardino Physicians'
for the rule that district court findings of pure law are subject to de novo re-
view). Only 4 reported cases involved corporate plaintiffs: Oceanside Golf
Inst. v. City of Oceanside, (Nos. 88-5647, 88-6056) (9th Cir. June 1, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds library, CTA-9 file) at 3; Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Port of
Oakland, 869 F.2d 1322, 1322 (9th Cir. 1989); S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin,
844 F.2d 962, 962 (2d Cir. 1988); Long Grove Country Club Estates v. Village of
Long Grove, 693 F. Supp. 640, 640 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Of the thirteen § 1983 cases
citing San Bernardino Physicians', all but Oceanside either found a protected
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quency of such cases suggests that exceptional restrictions are
not justified.
Even if the number of corporate contract due process cases
increases significantly, restricting a federal cause of action
based on a corporate contract's relative similarity to an individ-
ual employment contract raises the issue of corporate constitu-
tional rights. Because section 1983 provides only a vehicle for
constitutional claims to be heard in a federal forum, 197 critics
argue that the claims are not constitutionally grounded.19 Cor-
porations, however, as well as individuals, may be subject to the
state constitutional violations that section 1983 was enacted to
address.199 If federal due process rights extend to corpora-
tions,20 0 there is no less need for a federal forum for non-em-
ployment corporate public contracts than for individual
employment contracts when due process is implicated. As Jus-
tice Blackmun has noted, complaints that section 1983 claims
"are burdening the federal courts" are unpersuasive when the
claims are meritorious, because such a burden presumably is
worth bearing.201 Supreme Court decisions also articulate this
point. In Parratt, the Supreme Court indicated that Congress
property interest, see, e.g., Rockford Principals and Supervisors Ass'n v. Board
of Educ., 721 F. Supp. 948, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (concluding that salary package
assuring future wage increases is protected property interest), or dismissed the
case by employing an approach other than that used in San Bernardino Physi-
cians" See, e.g., Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239, 242-43, 245 (3d Cir. 1989) (ap-
plying Mathews and finding that sufficient procedural protection was available
to plaintiff in payment claim for special prosecutor's duties); Storek, 869 F.2d
at 1325 (holding that an incomplete property development contract is not a
property interest).
197. Although § 1983 only provides a federal cause of action and does not
mandate federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff may choose between a state or a fed-
eral forum. See supra notes 3 & 67.
198. Blackmun, supra note 68, at 21-22.
199. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 408-9 (1984) (in-
volving state violation of foreign corporation's fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess rights by subjecting it to in personam jurisdiction); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (involving state deprivation of corporation's
first amendment freedom of speech rights); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 511 (1925) (involving state violation of fourteenth amendment rights
by statutorily mandating attendance at public schools and threatening private
schools with loss of business).
200. See, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418-19 (1984) (holding that corpora-
tion's contacts with forum state were insufficient to subject it to in personam
jurisdiction); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778-79 n.14 (1978) (implying that corporations
are entitled to due process rights under the fourteenth amendment); see also
supra note 141 and accompanying text.




intended section 1983 to provide a federal cause of action "be-
cause, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance, or
otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of
citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges and immunities
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment might be denied by
the state agencies. '20 2
Reviewing the legislative history of section 1983 in
Mitchum v. Foster,203 the Court further noted that "Congress
clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between
the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of fed-
erally created rights; it was concerned that state instrumentali-
ties could not protect those rights."20 4 Although the Court has
been less than consistent in its support for federal intrusiveness
over comity,20 5 the Court nonetheless has continued to decide
section 1983 cases based on its intrusive interpretation of legis-
lative intent.206 The Court also recognizes that inappropriate
section 1983 claims may be dismissed using other available ap-
proaches, rather than by further limiting the scope of section
1983. Justice Blackmun notes that the Court effectively
screens cases by employing decisions, such as Parratt, that have
made it difficult to inappropriately "bootstrap a state-law tort
claim into a federal forum. '207
IV. DECIDING FUTURE SECTION 1983 CASES:
EMPLOYING EXISTING MECHANISMS
Federal courts do not need San Bernardino Physicians'
highly restrictive threshold for excluding section 1983 actions
involving public contract property rights. A review of the cases
frequently cited for the proposition that some public contract
property interests are less deserving of protection than other
contract interests indicates that, in most cases, resolution of the
issue is not essential to decide the case.208 Indeed, it appears
that the constraints currently imposed by determining that an
entitlement is too discretionary to be protected property, that a
202. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1981) (quoting Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961)).
203. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
204. I& at 242.
205. See supra note 67.
206. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540-42 (1984) (quoting
Mitchum's analysis of legislative history and holding that "judicial immunity is
not a bar to prospective injunctive relief" under § 1983).
207. Blackmun, supra note 68, at 21.
208. See supra notes 72-116 and accompanying text.
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property interest does not arise from official policy, or that a
plaintiff received the process that was due, act to effectively
screen claims asserted under section 1983.209 The logistical
fears flowing from constitutionalizing breach of public contract
claims thus appear to be illusory.
Courts should rely on the decisional tools already at their
disposal to resolve public contract claims under section 1983. In
particular, the Supreme Court's decisions in Mathews v. El-
dridge and Parratt v. Taylor expand federal courts' ability to
determine the appropriate process due to resolve cases involv-
ing contract property rights.210 Use of these accepted tools
would provide sufficient and more appropriate screening of
cases than the San Bernardino Physicians' approach. Applica-
tion of these constraints is not, of course, intended to screen out
all section 1983 public contract claims. Certainly, some section
1983 corporate public contract claims merit judicial review.
Courts should recognize that Congress and the Supreme
Court have acknowledged the need for section 1983 as a vehicle
providing a federal cause of action for constitutional claims.211
It is most unrealistic to believe that the reasons for providing a
federal cause of action should be any less applicable to corpo-
rate non-employment public contract claims than to individual
employment contract claims. The pervasive role local govern-
ment plays in our society ensures the development of a large
number of contractual relationships between government and
private parties. Support for these contractual relationships is
essential to maintaining the public/private partnership that
characterizes our society and marks the shift from a society
based on status, to one employing contract.2' 2 In order to main-
209. See supra notes 72-116 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 57-116 and accompanying text.
212. "[Ihe movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a move-
ment from Status to Contract." H. MAINE, ANCIENr LAW: ITS CONNECTION
WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS
182 (F. Pollock rev. ed. 1930) (10th ed. 1884) (emphasis in original); see also
Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEx. L. REV. 103, 134-35
(1988) (arguing that contract law provides an important social ordering mecha-
nism and remains relevant and responsive to "today's highly relational
world").
Despite recent concerns prematurely heralding contract law's death, see,
e.g., G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87, 94 (1974) (suggesting that ex-
panding tort doctrine is absorbing the contract bargain theory); MacNeil, Con-
tracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassica4 and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854, 873-86 (1978)
(suggesting that "neoclassical" contract law is unsuitable for the modern world
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tain the integrity of these contractual relationships, it is impor-
tant that private parties have confidence in the judicial
recourse available to them in the event of government depriva-
tion of contract based rights. Presumptively confining a corpo-
ration's claim against a local government to that government's
judicial forums is not likely to inspire corporate confidence in
judicial safeguards. Lack of corporate confidence may nega-
tively affect corporations' willingness to do business with gov-
ernment on terms not adequately compensating them for the
risk of improper termination. Future section 1983 cases involv-
ing public contract property interests may portend and influ-
ence the relationship between corporations and government in
our society.2 1 3
CONCLUSION
Although section 1983 provides a federal cause of action
against government entities for persons deprived of constitu-
tionally protected property interests, courts have not been in-
clined to afford protection to property interests arising from
public contracts. Although courts have decried the federaliza-
tion of all public contract disputes, they have historically re-
of relational contracting), there is significant reason to believe that contract
law will continue to metamorphosize and play an important societal role. See,
e.g., Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV. 103, 134-
35 (1988) (arguing that contract law is adapting, rather than dying, and that
modern contract law remains relevant and responsive to "today's highly rela-
tional world").
213. The courts currently have an opportunity to confront this issue di-
rectly. A case has been filed in federal district court in Minnesota that ap-
pears to squarely present the courts with the issue of § 1983 protection of
corporate public contract rights. In La Societe Generale Immobliere v. Minne-
apolis Community Dev. Agency (D.Minn. June 8, 1989) (No. 3-89-CV-372)
(complaint), the plaintiff (LSGI) is suing a municipal development agency for
breach of a contract and lease to develop a shopping center in Minneapolis.
The contract was developed and entered into in accordance with specific pro-
cess provisions of MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 422 (1980 & Supp. 1988), and is
terminable only for cause. The Agency's commissioners, who are also the
Minneapolis city council, voted to breach the contract. LSGI alleges depriva-
tion of due process in the breach of the contract and in amendments to the
contract by the city. On the pleadings, the case appears to dispense with the
court's ability to resolve the issue through application of the traditional previ-
ously discussed mechanisms. If none of these approaches is applicable, the
court may employ alternatively the tests used in San Bernardino Physicians'
and Oceanside, or forge a new approach. Assuming appellate review by the
Eighth Circuit, this case potentially represents a test of the Ninth Circuit's po-
sition on constitutionalizing corporate public contract property interests. The




solved public contract cases through means other than limiting
the types of protected property interests. The Ninth Circuit's
decision in San Bernardino Physicians' moves beyond rhetoric,
and limits constitutional protection to those contractually de-
rived property rights that are similar to employment contracts
and individual in nature.
The federalism concerns that impel the Ninth Circuit ap-
pear illusory given the small number of corporate public con-
tract due process cases, and thus seem outweighed by the need
for corporate access to a federal forum to remedy state discrim-
ination. Discrimination against public service contract rights
seems unnecessary. By appropriately employing existing ac-
cepted distinctions to weed out improper section 1983 claims,
courts can expeditiously resolve cases involving public contract
property interests without, in the name of federalism, unjustifi-
ably disadvantaging claims that are not individual in nature or
that do not resemble employment contracts.
Henri G. Minette
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